Page 93 - KBHA BULLETIN 6

Later, under A/M van Blommestein, MV Cannuck went out to attend to the targets’

moorings. On the Sunday, more work was required on No. 1 Target and PL1 and Cannuck

were used to place marker buoys on the remaining half of the target.

On 6 December 1943 R10 was on stand-by duty for the aircraft carrier HMS Ameer, as new
pilots practised their landings and take-offs. There were 33 landings and 3 crashes on the

carrier itself but no injuries were sustained. The following day R10 was back on duty, but
the seas had come up and although the pilots managed 49 landings in rough conditions it

was a long and uncomfortable 13 hours for the crew of the crash boat. They were battered

by spray and in the rough conditions they could not prepare any hot food. Eventually they
went aboard the carrier at 23h00 for a warm meal and then they moored in Simon’s Town

for the night. Again on 8 December, R10 with Lt. Webster in command, acted as standby

for the carrier in False Bay, as 31 landings and 2 onboard crashes took place. They moored
at Gordon’s Bay and returned to their Cape Town base the next morning taking 2 hours 40

minutes for the trip.

A limited amount of aircrew training still took place over False Bay, with Lockheed PVs of
17 Squadron conducting bombing exercises. As had been routine during the war, a target

was towed 1500 ft. behind a crash boat, in this case R2, which followed a course from

Steenbras Point to Simonsberg. Each aircraft was scheduled to drop 10 bombs and would
commence the run in after a green Very Light had been fired from the boat. All exercises

were terminated with a red Very Light, indicating that the aircraft was to leave the range
and await further instruction.

Bombing practice continued throughout 1943 and 1944. Normally, one or two targets were

towed at 18.5 knots behind a crash boat in False Bay. Often there was no radio

communication between boat and aircraft and only Very lights were used to indicate time
on and off the range. Problems with delays in aircraft over the range were frequent, as were

rough sea conditions and winds which made it difficult for spotters on the boats to see

where the bombs landed. Instead of hauling in the targets when waiting for aircraft, the

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